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Turbulent But Profitable 
Banking and financial markets were buffeted 
in 1979 by i'nflation, recession fears, 
increased international tensions, and then by 
the Federal Reserve's decisive monetary-
policy actions of October 6. Funds generally 
remained available to meet 1979 credit 
demands, but interest rates were very high 
and very volati Ie. Yet the nation's commercial 
banks posted record profits during the year, 
attesting to their ability to adjust to rapid 
economic and financial changes. Those 
profits reflected a robust 11 Y2-percent 
expansion in bank credit, as well as a rate of 
return on assets high enough to maintain a 
favorable spread over banks' increasingly 
costly funds. 
Policy tightens 
Faced with an acceleration of inflation at 
home and abroad, the Federal Reserve 
moved forcibly on October 6 to achieve 
better control over money and credit 
expansion. Earlier restrictive actions-
including several boosts in the discount rate 
(from 9Y2 to 11  percent)-had failed to stem 
the rapid growth of  the money supply and of 
the inflation indexes. Thus the Fed unveiled 
its "Saturday night special" of October 6: 
1) increasing the discount rate on member-
bank borrowings a full percentage point, to a 
record 12 percent; 2)  imposing an 8-percent 
reserve requirement on increases in the 
aggregate total of certain "managed 
liabilities," such as large time certificates 
(CD's) and Eurodo"ar borrowings, and 
3)  making a fundamental change in the 
System's monetary-control procedures to 
focus on bank reserves, rather than on the 
Federal-funds rate which governs interbank 
borrowings. 
These actions helped produce a significantly 
slower growth in the money supply and bank 
credit in the fourth quarter-and also a 
greater volatility in money-market rates 
before market participants accustomed 
themselves to a new and unfamiliar operating 
environment. With the fourth-quarter 
deceleration, the annual growth of the 
narrow M 1 money supply (currency plus 
bank demand deposits) fell within the 3- to 
6-percent target growth range which the Fed 
had announced earlier in the year. (This 
figure adjusts for the impact on demand-
deposit growth of automatic transfer-from-
savings accounts.) Again, with the late-year 
deceleration, the growth of the broader M2 
measure (currency plus a" bank deposits 
except large negotiable CD's) came in only 
slightly above the upper end ofthe 5- to 
8-percent target range after having been 
considerably higher earlier in the year. 
Financial markets grow 
Net funds raised in 1979's financial markets 
roughly matched the 1978 total, according to 
preliminary estimates, as private-sector 
borrowing offset a decline in debt financing 
by the public sector. Although Treasury debt 
increased only half as fast as in 1978, foreign 
holders liquidated substantial amounts of _ 
government securities, forcing the Treasury to 
rely more heavily on domestic purchasers to 
finance its debt offerings. State-and-Iocal 
governments showed modest increases in 
borrowing and spending. In contrast, 
Federally sponsored agencies boosted their 
debt by record amounts, primarily in order to 
provide support for the hard-pressed 
mortgage-finance industry. In the private 
sector, corporate long-term debt expanded at 
about the 1978 pace, but corporate short-
term debt rose as firms increased their 
reliance on bank credit and doubled their 
sales of open-market paper. 
Although funds remained available, they also 
became more costly. Short-term rates were 
three percentage points higher atthe end than 
atthe beginning of  the year, under  the impact 
of accelerating inflation, energy shocks, and 
a tighter Federal Reserve pol icy. Rate 
movements also became very volatile after 
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climbing at midyear as business activity 
quickened, then shot upward after the 
October 6 policy package, and finally eased 
in November'and December as the markets 
learned how to operate in the new policy 
environment. October's record rates on large 
CD's, Federal funds and commercial paper 
prompted banks to hike their prime business-
loan rate to a record 15% percent, but they 
later reduced that rate to 15 percent as thei r 
cost of funds began to decline. In contrast, 
Treasury-bill rates lagged considerably 
behind other money-market rates. 
Long-term corporate bond rates rose 
modestly in the first half, accelerated during 
the summer as inflation expectations 
worsened, and then rose even faster in the fall 
as fears surfaced about declining credit 
availability. Throughout the year, the yield 
curve retained an "inverted (IJhumpbacked'~) 
shape, with higher yields on short- and 
intermediate-term maturities than on long-
term issues, as is typical of inflation periods. 
Prime mortgage rates rose steadily over most 
of  the year, except in states with restrictive 
usury laws; after October 6 they rose as high 
" as 14 percent in some areas, exerting a 
dampening impact on housing activity. 
Bank credit expands 
Commercial-bank credit expanded by 
$117 billion in 1979-a  substantial 
11 Y2  percent gain, although somewhat behind 
the 1978 pace. Loans accounted for 
84 percent of  the total gai n -down from the 
preceding year's 90-percentshare-as banks 
built up their liquidity by adding to their 
holdings of Federal agency and tax-exempt 
securities while maintaining their Treasury 
securities atthe 1978 level. Business demand 
for bank credit rose over $40 billion, an 
accelerated 17  -percent rate, reflecting strong 
corporate needs for working capital and for 
increasingly expensive inventories. 
However, this strength was concentrated in 
the first and third quarters of  the year. The 
pace of business borrowing at major money-
center banks, particularly in New York, far 
exceeded that at small banks during most of 
the year, but was' relatively weaker in the 
fourth quarter. 
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In contrast to this uneven business-borrowing 
behavior, bank mortgage lending continued 
strong throughout 1979. (However, the 
$32-billion increase lagged behind the 
phenomenal 1977  -78 pace.) Thesteep late-
year rise in mortgage rates could be expected 
to dampen activity in this area, but it came 
too late to affect 1979 data because of  the 
long time-lag between mortgage 
commitments and actual loan take-downs. 
The major shift in loan demand last year 
came from the household sector. Consumer 
borrowing remained strong until about 
midyear. Then the pace slackened 
significantly as consumers, as well as lenders, 
became more cautious in response to rising 
consumer-debt ratios, and as declining real 
income and recession fears brought adecline 
in consumers' large-ticket purchases. 
MMC's dominant role 
To finance this credit expansion, banks relied 
heavi lyon certai n types of  ti me deposits and 
on non-deposit sources of  funds. Demand 
deposits made only a relatively weak 
contribution. 
Money-market certificates (MMC's), with 
their rates tied to the 6-month Treasury-bill 
rate, were the most noteworthy source of 
funds. MMC~s  quadrupled in volume during 
the year, offsetting an outflow in fixed-ceiling 
savings deposits. Moreover, as banks shifted 
into these new market-rate consumer 
instruments, they relied considerably less  '0 
than usual on the normal deposit 
"stabilizing" function of large-denomination 
time certificates (CD's). In fact, CD issuance 
remained practically unchanged in 1979-
unlike 1978 and other recent periods of high 
interest rates-because banks could obtain 
funds more cheaply through money-market 
certificates and through non-deposit sources 
such as Eurodollars. 
Rising bank earnings 
Bank income apparently reached a new peak 
in 1979, according to preliminary estimates 
for the year. Operating earnings increased as 
banks expanded their volume of earning 
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saari ng rates of retu rn on those assets - for 
example, the prime business-loan rate rose 
from a midyear level of 11112  percentto a fall 
peak of 15% percent. 
Money-center banks in particular benefited 
from the large expansion in business loans at 
rates tied to the higher prime rate. Regional 
banks meanwhile profited from portfolios 
heavily weighted with high-interest-rate 
mortgage and consumer loans, even though 
rates on such loans did not rise as fast as the 
business prime. These developments helped 
banks to maintain a favorable spread 
between their return on assets and their cost 
of  funds. Income statements at many banks 
also improved because of reductions in the 
amounts set aside for loan-loss reserves, 
reflecting their more favorable experience 
with loan write-offs and write-downs. 
However, the cost of bank funds also rose 
steeply as the year progressed, especially in 
view of a shift from less costly sources of 
funds (those subject to fixed deposit-rate 
ceilings) to more expensive sources acquired 
at accelerating market rates. Money-market 
certificates largely replaced the outflow of 
less-expensive savings deposits, and their 
cost climbed as Treasury-bill rates rose. Even 
the "core" savings deposits became more 
expensive after midyear when the 
Regulation Q ceiling rate rose from 5 to 
5% percent. Costs on other liabilities-large 
CD's, Eurodollars, Federal funds and 
borrowings from the Fed-all rose to record 
highs in the fourth quarter. In addition, after 
October 6 those banks whose "managed 
liabilities" exceeded their aggregate 
September base became subject to an 
8-percent marginal reserve requirement. But 
overall, the 1979 profits picture reflected 
banks' successful weathering of last year's 
highly volatile interest-rate environment. 
Clouded outlook 
Both domestic and international 
uncertainties cloud the 1980 outlook. The 
full impact of the late-fall monetary-policy 
moves will become more evident after the 
normal early-year paydowns of  high seasonal 
December borrowings. However, the 
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business-loan expansion could remain fairly 
strong as corporations continue to rely on 
short-term financing instead of costly longer-
term funding in the capital markets. Any 
invol!Jntary inventory accumulation, as the 
economy slows, also would call for increased 
bank borrowings-at least in the short-term. 
On the other hand, many large and some 
middle-market corporations will continue to 
use the commercial-paper market as a less 
costly alternative to bank financing. 
In contrast, a reduction in mortgage lending 
appears assured for the early months of  the 
year, reflecting the recent high mortgage rates 
which "rationed out" many potential first-
time home owners. Moreover, reduced home 
construction has already become evident 
because of restricted credit availability. 
Again, in view of current economic 
uncertainties,' consLirriers will probably 
continue to restrict their purchases of large-
ticket goods and remain cautious about 
expanding bank-held debt. 
The new 8-percent marginal reserve 
requirement on managed liabilities should 
increasingly be written into the cost of credit 
expansion, because banks will find it more 
difficult over time to stay within their 
September base for such liabilities. 
Meanwhile, a shift in banks' liability structure 
from managed "purchased" liabilities 
toward consumer-oriented market-rate 
instruments should continue, reflecting the 
popularity of  MMC's and the new 
authorization in January for 2Y2-year (and 
longer) certificates tied to yields on Treasury 
issues of like maturity. 
The heavy weighting of  bank portfolios by  the 
high-yielding earning assets acquired last 
year should help banks maintain a favorable 
interest spread over thei r average cost of 
funds, particularly if short-term rates ease 
somewhat. At the same time, earnings in 
coming months could be hurt by a slower rate 
of loan expansion, and possibly by increased 
loan losses. Under any scenario, banks may 
have difficulty adjusting to 1980's financial-
market uncertainties.  h  -I 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH fEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time dePosits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+  )/Deficiency (  -) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+  )/Net borrowed (  - ) 
Federal Funds - Seven Large Banks 
Net interbank transactions 
[Purchases (+  )/Sales (-)] 
Net, U.s. Securities dealer transactions 
[Loans (+  )/Borrowings (-)] 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
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Change from 
yearago@ 
Dollar  Percent 
16,899  +  14.00 
16,218  +  16.40 
4,404  +  15.70 
8,597  +  24.60 
4,602  +  23.60 
353  - 18.60 
566  - 7.30 
1,303  +  9.10 
2,348  +  4.90 
3,270  +  10.10 
1,602  5.30 
7,084  +  13.80 
7,999  +  19.20 






+  694 
+  369 
@ Historical data are not strictly comparable due to changes in the reporting panel; however, adjustments 
have been applied to 1978 data to remove as much as possible the effects of the changes in coverage. In 
addition, for some items, historical data are not available due to definitional changes. 
Editorial comments may be addressed to the editor (William Burke) or to the author •... Free copies of 
this and other Federal Reserve publications can be obtained by calling or writing the Public Information 
Se(iion, Federal  Reserve  Bank of San  Francisco,  P.O.  Box  7702, San  Francisco 94120. Phone (415) . 
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